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<h2 id="series-defi-infrastructure-for-institutions"><strong>Series: DeFi Infrastructure for Institutions</strong></h2><p><a href="http://p2p.org/?ref=p2p.org">P2P.org</a>'s content series for regulated institutions evaluating on-chain capital allocation. Each article addresses a specific infrastructure, governance, or compliance dimension that determines whether a DeFi allocation can clear institutional approval and operate within mandate.</p><p>This is the third and closing article of the regulatory trilogy examining the external pressure making institutional-grade vault governance a requirement rather than an option. <a href="https://p2p.org/economy/mica-defi-vaults-institutional-allocators/">The first article</a> examined what MiCA means for DeFi vault operators and institutional allocators. <a href="https://p2p.org/economy/travel-rule-defi-vaults-onchain-compliance-gap/">The second article</a> examined Travel Rule enforcement and the on-chain compliance gap. This article examines how conflict-of-interest frameworks across MiFID II, AIFMD II, and IOSCO's DeFi-specific recommendations are converging on the same structural problem: the DeFi vault curator model creates conflicts of interest that existing and emerging regulatory frameworks now require to be identified, documented, and managed.</p><p><em>Previously in this series: </em><a href="https://p2p.org/economy/travel-rule-enforcement-and-the-onchain-compliance-gap/"><em>Travel Rule Enforcement and the Onchain Compliance Gap</em></a></p><h2 id="introduction">Introduction</h2><p>The second article of this series established that the DeFi vault curator model creates a structural conflict of interest: curators are incentivised by TVL growth and performance fees, not by mandate alignment with any individual depositor. The architecture places no independent check between their decisions and on-chain settlement. That conflict was examined as a governance problem in the first trilogy of this series.</p><p>What this article examines is a different dimension of the same problem: the conflict of interest in DeFi vault design is not just a governance gap. It is increasingly a regulatory gap. Three distinct regulatory frameworks, developed independently, in different jurisdictions, for different purposes, are converging on the same conclusion: the arrangement where a single entity designs an investment strategy, executes it, and benefits from its performance without independent oversight creates conflicts of interest that regulated institutions cannot accept and that regulators are now actively scrutinising.</p><p>MiFID II's conflict of interest requirements, currently under a 2026 ESMA Common Supervisory Action examining how firms comply, apply to any investment firm providing portfolio management services to EU clients. AIFMD II, which required transposition into national law by April 16, 2026, introduces expanded conflict of interest requirements for alternative investment fund managers, including specific rules on delegation arrangements where the delegating manager and the delegate have aligned financial incentives. IOSCO's DeFi Policy Recommendations, published in December 2023 and now being implemented across more than 130 jurisdictions covering 95% of global securities markets, include Recommendation 4, which explicitly requires regulators to mandate the identification and addressing of conflicts of interest in DeFi arrangements.</p><p>None of these frameworks were designed with the DeFi vault curator model specifically in mind. All of them, when applied, produce the same requirement: identify the conflict, document it, disclose it, and put in place governance controls that can be demonstrated to regulators. Most current DeFi vault products cannot satisfy that requirement. The regulatory gap is now closing faster than the infrastructure gap.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="https://p2p.org/economy/content/images/2026/05/conflict-of-interest-regulatory-frameworks-convergence.jpg" class="kg-image" alt="A three-column diagram showing MiFID II Article 23, AIFMD II, and IOSCO Recommendation 4 as three separate regulatory frameworks, each with subtitle details on scope and timeline, connected by converging arrows to a central box stating that the curator model conflict of interest requires governance infrastructure, resolving into three outcome boxes covering conflict of interest policy and disclosure, independent validation at execution level, and contractual role separation." loading="lazy" width="1600" height="900" srcset="https://p2p.org/economy/content/images/size/w600/2026/05/conflict-of-interest-regulatory-frameworks-convergence.jpg 600w, https://p2p.org/economy/content/images/size/w1000/2026/05/conflict-of-interest-regulatory-frameworks-convergence.jpg 1000w, https://p2p.org/economy/content/images/2026/05/conflict-of-interest-regulatory-frameworks-convergence.jpg 1600w" sizes="(min-width: 720px) 720px"><figcaption><i><em class="italic" style="white-space: pre-wrap;">Three regulatory frameworks converging on the same conclusion: the curator model requires governance infrastructure.</em></i></figcaption></figure><h2 id="learnings-for-busy-readers">Learnings for Busy Readers</h2><p>Short on time? Here are the key takeaways. For the full analysis and supporting data, continue reading below.</p><p>Three regulatory frameworks are independently converging on the conflict of interest in DeFi vault design.</p><p>MiFID II Article 23 requires investment firms to identify, prevent, and manage conflicts of interest when providing investment services. ESMA launched a Common Supervisory Action on MiFID II conflicts of interest compliance in 2026, with a specific focus on remuneration structures and the role of digital platforms in directing investors toward certain products. A vault operator providing portfolio management services to EU clients under a MiFID II license faces direct application of these requirements to its curator incentive structure.</p><p>AIFMD II, which required national transposition by April 16, 2026, reinforces that alternative investment fund managers must prevent, or where unavoidable, identify, manage, and monitor conflicts of interest to protect AIF investors. Its expanded delegation rules are directly relevant to the curator-as-operator arrangement: where the delegating manager and the delegate have aligned financial incentives, AIFMD II requires those conflicts to be explicitly managed and disclosed.</p><p>IOSCO's Recommendation 4, applying its "same activity, same risk, same regulation" principle to DeFi, requires regulators to mandate that DeFi Responsible Persons proactively identify and resolve conflicts arising from various roles or affiliations. IOSCO specifically identifies the vertical integration of strategy design and execution, the same structural feature that characterises the curator model, as a category of conflict that is not capable of being managed through disclosure alone and may require structural remedies, including legal disaggregation of functions.</p><p>For vault operators, the regulatory direction is unambiguous. The curator model, as currently structured, does not satisfy these frameworks without additional governance infrastructure. For institutional allocators, the convergence of these frameworks changes the due diligence question from "does this vault operator have a conflict of interest policy?" to "can they demonstrate that the conflict is structurally managed at the execution level?"</p><h2 id="mifid-ii-conflict-of-interest-requirements-for-investment-firms">MiFID II: Conflict of Interest Requirements for Investment Firms</h2><p>MiFID II Article 23 requires investment firms to take all appropriate steps to identify and prevent or manage conflicts of interest between themselves and their clients, and between clients, when providing investment services, including portfolio management. The requirements are not disclosure-only: firms must first prevent conflicts where possible, and where prevention is not possible, manage them through governance controls and disclosure.</p><p>The practical requirements under MiFID II include maintaining and operating effective organisational and administrative arrangements to prevent conflicts from adversely affecting client interests, maintaining a conflicts of interest policy that identifies circumstances giving rise to conflicts and specifies procedures to manage those conflicts, and disclosing the general nature and sources of conflicts to clients where organisational arrangements are insufficient to prevent damage to client interests.</p><p>The relevance to DeFi vault operators is direct. Any entity providing crypto-asset portfolio management services under a MiFID II license, or under MiCA's CASP framework, which incorporates MiFID II conflict of interest standards by reference, faces the full application of these requirements. A vault operator whose curator function is incentivised by TVL growth and performance fees has a documented conflict between its own economic interests and its clients' interests in mandate-aligned execution. That conflict must be identified in the conflicts of interest policy, managed through governance controls, and disclosed where those controls are insufficient.</p><p>The stakes of non-compliance have increased materially in 2026. ESMA launched a Common Supervisory Action on MiFID II conflict of interest requirements, running through 2026, specifically examining how firms comply with their obligations when offering investment products to clients. The supervisory action focuses on the possible impact of staff remuneration and inducements on what products are offered to investors, the role of digital platforms in directing investors toward certain products, and whether firms manage potential conflicts between their own profits and client needs. All three focus areas apply directly to the curator incentive structure in DeFi vault products.</p><p>Source: <a href="https://cms.law/en/int/regulatory-news/esma-mifid-ii-conflict-of-interest-requirements?ref=p2p.org">ESMA, Common Supervisory Action on MiFID II Conflicts of Interest Requirements</a>, 2026.</p><h2 id="aifmd-ii-delegation-conflicts-and-the-curator-as-operator-arrangement">AIFMD II: Delegation, Conflicts, and the Curator-as-Operator Arrangement</h2><p>AIFMD II, which required national transposition by April 16, 2026, introduces expanded requirements for alternative investment fund managers on delegation, conflicts of interest, and the management of arrangements where the delegating manager and the delegate have aligned financial incentives.</p><p>The conflict of interest provisions in AIFMD II are particularly relevant to the DeFi vault context because they address a scenario that maps precisely onto the curator-as-operator arrangement: where a third-party AIFM manages an AIF initially backed by a delegated portfolio manager or a related group entity. In this setup, AIFMD II explicitly acknowledges that potential conflicts of interest are expected and emphasises the need for AIFMs to prevent, or if unavoidable, identify, manage, and monitor these conflicts to protect the interests of the AIF and its investors. (Source: DLA Piper, New AIFMD II Rules on Delegation and Conflicts of Interest, April 2024.)</p><p>For institutional allocators that are AIFMs or UCITS management companies, AIFMD II's delegation requirements now extend to the oversight of delegates. An AIFM that delegates portfolio management functions to a third party, including interaction with DeFi vault protocols through a curator, must verify that the delegate complies with AIFMD II standards applicable to those functions. The fact that a delegate is regulated in its home jurisdiction does not relieve the AIFM of this obligation.</p><p>Source: Arthur Cox, <a href="https://www.arthurcox.com/knowledge/delegation-under-aifmd-ii-practical-implications-for-aifms/?ref=p2p.org">Delegation Under AIFMD II: Practical Implications for AIFMs</a>, December 2025.</p><p>The practical implication for DeFi vault allocation is that institutional allocators operating as AIFMs cannot treat the vault operator as a black box. They must verify that the vault operator's governance arrangements for managing curator conflicts of interest satisfy AIFMD II standards, including documentation of the conflict, controls preventing the conflict from adversely affecting allocation decisions, and disclosure to the AIFM that allows it to fulfil its own regulatory obligations.</p><blockquote><strong>The institutional digital asset space moves fast.</strong> Our subscribers get structured analysis across staking, DeFi vaults, and regulation through <em>DeFi Dispatch</em>, <em>Institutional Lens</em>, <em>DeFi Infrastructure for Institutions</em>, and <em>Legal Layer</em>. No noise. Just the signals that matter. <strong>Subscribe to the newsletter at the bottom of this page.</strong></blockquote><h2 id="iosco-recommendation-4-conflict-of-interest-in-defi-at-global-scale">IOSCO Recommendation 4: Conflict of Interest in DeFi at Global Scale</h2><p>IOSCO's Policy Recommendations for Decentralized Finance, published in December 2023 and now being implemented across jurisdictions covering more than 95% of global securities markets, include Recommendation 4, which requires regulators to mandate that DeFi Responsible Persons proactively identify and resolve conflicts of interest arising from various roles or affiliations.</p><p>IOSCO's approach is grounded in its "same activity, same risk, same regulation" principle: DeFi arrangements that provide financial products and services equivalent to those provided by traditional market intermediaries should be regulated to achieve the same outcomes for investor protection and market integrity. Applied to DeFi vault curators, this means that an entity managing assets on behalf of others in a fiduciary-like capacity faces the same conflict of interest requirements as a traditional investment manager, regardless of whether the arrangement is characterised as decentralised.</p><p>IOSCO specifically identifies vertical integration of activities and functions as a category of conflict that creates particular regulatory concern. Its Policy Recommendations for Crypto and Digital Asset Markets noted that a CASP engaging in multiple activities in a vertically integrated manner gives rise to conflicts of interest that may not be capable of being managed through disclosure alone and may require structural remedies. (Source: IOSCO, Policy Recommendations for Crypto and Digital Asset Markets, November 2023.) Recommendation 4 for DeFi goes further, urging regulators to consider robust intervention for significant conflicts, including enforcing legal disaggregation and separate registration and regulation of certain activities.</p><p>Source: <a href="https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ioscopd754.pdf?ref=p2p.org">IOSCO, Final Report with Policy Recommendations for Decentralized Finance</a>, December 2023.</p><p>The October 2025 IOSCO thematic review assessing implementation of its crypto and digital asset recommendations found that all participating jurisdictions had made progress implementing Recommendation 2 on governance and disclosure of conflicts of interest, with ten jurisdictions having relevant requirements already in force. The assessment methodology for consistent assessments by IOSCO's Assessment Committee is being developed in 2026, with regular consistency assessments beginning afterwards.</p><p>Source: <a href="https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD801.pdf?ref=p2p.org">IOSCO, Thematic Review Assessing the Implementation of IOSCO Recommendations</a>, October 2025.</p><h2 id="what-the-curator-market-is-doing-in-response">What the Curator Market Is Doing in Response</h2><p>The regulatory direction is visible in how the curator market itself is beginning to evolve. A public report published in December 2025 that analysed the DeFi curator market noted that the curator market currently operates in a regulatory grey area, with curators not holding assets or controlling capital directly but performing work that closely resembles activities of regulated investment advisors. The analysis found that none of the major curators are licensed as of late 2025, but concluded that to serve banks and registered investment advisors, curators will need investment advisor registration, KYC capabilities, and institutional custody integration, the compliance stack that crypto-native players have deliberately avoided.</p><p>The same analysis identified the direction of travel explicitly: over the coming years, resolving gaps in regulatory clarity, risk metrics, and technical interoperability will transform curators from crypto-native specialists into a fully licensed, ratings-driven infrastructure that channels institutional capital into on-chain yield with similar standards to traditional finance.</p><p>Source: <a href="https://chorus.one/reports-research/defi-curators-in-2025-navigating-chaos-building-resilience?ref=p2p.org">Chorus One, DeFi Curators in 2025: Navigating Chaos, Building Resilience</a>, December 2025.</p><p>This trajectory is significant for both vault operators and institutional allocators. For vault operators, it signals that the conflict of interest question is not a temporary compliance gap to be managed around. It is a structural feature of the curator model that regulatory frameworks across multiple jurisdictions are independently identified as requiring governance infrastructure. The operators who build that infrastructure now will be positioned as the curator market professionalises. Those who defer it will face a harder transition when licensing requirements arrive.</p><p>For institutional allocators, the trajectory creates a timing question. The conflict of interest frameworks that apply to their counterparties today, MiFID II, AIFMD II, and MiCA, already require governance controls that most current vault products do not provide. The IOSCO implementation timeline means that equivalent requirements will apply in an expanding set of jurisdictions. The due diligence question is not whether these requirements will apply. It is whether the vault operators they are considering can satisfy them now.</p><h2 id="the-regulatory-trilogy-in-summary-three-requirements-one-missing-layer">The Regulatory Trilogy in Summary: Three Requirements, One Missing Layer</h2><p>This trilogy has traced three distinct regulatory developments, each examining a different dimension of the institutional DeFi compliance environment.</p><p>The first article established that MiCA, while not directly regulating DeFi protocols, comprehensively regulates the operators serving institutional clients through them. Its CASP framework introduces mandatory governance standards for conflict of interest management, client asset safeguarding, and audit trail production that apply to any entity providing vault management services to EU clients.</p><p>The second article established that Travel Rule enforcement, now applying to every CASP-to-CASP transfer with no minimum threshold in the EU since December 30, 2024, creates a structural compliance gap in DeFi vault architecture. Smart contracts do not generate originator and beneficiary data. Closing the gap requires a data layer above the execution environment that most vault products were never designed to include.</p><p>This article establishes that conflict of interest frameworks across MiFID II, AIFMD II, and IOSCO's DeFi recommendations are independently converging on the curator model as a compliance problem. The vertical integration of strategy design, execution, and economic benefit without independent oversight creates conflicts that these frameworks require to be identified, documented, disclosed, and managed through governance controls that can be demonstrated to regulators.</p><p>All three regulatory developments point to the same missing infrastructure layer: an independent governance function sitting above the execution environment, operating at the transaction level, independent of the curator, validating mandate alignment, producing an exportable compliance log, and maintaining contractually defined role separation. The first trilogy of this series established that this layer is missing from most DeFi vault products. This trilogy establishes that its absence is now a regulatory compliance problem across three distinct and converging frameworks.</p><h2 id="key-takeaway">Key Takeaway</h2><p>Conflict-of-interest regulation did not arrive in DeFi. It was already there, in MiFID II and AIFMD, applied to the investment managers and fund operators who are the institutional allocators in DeFi vault products. What has changed is that AIFMD II has now extended those requirements to delegation arrangements, MiCA has applied equivalent standards to vault operators directly, and IOSCO's DeFi recommendations are extending the same framework globally across 95% of securities markets.</p><p>The curator model, as currently structured in most DeFi vault products, does not satisfy these frameworks without additional governance infrastructure. The conflict between curator incentives and institutional mandate alignment must be identified, documented, disclosed, and managed through controls that can be demonstrated to regulators. Most current products cannot produce that demonstration.</p><p>For vault operators, the direction is clear. The regulatory frameworks that govern their institutional clients are already applying conflict of interest requirements that reach into the vault architecture. The operators who build independent governance infrastructure now will be positioned for the institutional market as it matures. Those who treat conflict of interest management as a future compliance question will find it has already become a present one.</p><p>For institutional allocators, the two trilogies of this series have traced a complete picture: the structural gaps in DeFi vault architecture, the conflict of interest at the curator layer, the mandate validation standard that closes both gaps, and now the regulatory frameworks that make building that governance layer a legal requirement rather than a best practice.</p><p>The infrastructure that satisfies all three regulatory frameworks, pre-execution controls, exportable compliance logs, and contractual role separation, is the same infrastructure that the first trilogy identified as the missing governance layer in DeFi vault design. The regulatory environment is not creating a new requirement. It is formalising the one that was always there.</p><p><em>The DeFi Infrastructure for Institutions series continues. The next sequence examines specific dimensions of how the protection layer operates in practice for specific institutional profiles.</em></p><h2 id="frequently-asked-questions-faqs">Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)<br></h2><h3 id="how-does-mifid-iis-conflict-of-interest-framework-apply-to-defi-vault-operators">How does MiFID II's conflict of interest framework apply to DeFi vault operators?</h3><p>MiFID II Article 23 requires investment firms providing portfolio management services to identify, prevent, and manage conflicts of interest between themselves and their clients. Any vault operator providing crypto-asset portfolio management services under a MiFID II license, or under MiCA's CASP framework, which incorporates MiFID II conflict of interest standards by reference, faces direct application of these requirements. A curator incentivised by TVL growth and performance fees has a documented conflict between its economic interests and its clients' interests in mandate-aligned execution. That conflict must be identified in the operator's conflicts of interest policy, managed through governance controls, and disclosed where those controls are insufficient to prevent damage to client interests.</p><h3 id="what-does-aifmd-ii-add-to-the-conflict-of-interest-requirements-for-institutional-allocators">What does AIFMD II add to the conflict of interest requirements for institutional allocators?</h3><p>AIFMD II, which required national transposition by April 16, 2026, expands conflict of interest requirements for alternative investment fund managers and introduces specific obligations around delegation arrangements. An AIFM that delegates portfolio management functions to a third party, including interaction with DeFi vault protocols through a curator, must verify that the delegate complies with AIFMD II standards applicable to those functions. The fact that a delegate is regulated in its home jurisdiction does not relieve the AIFM of this obligation. Institutional allocators operating as AIFMs must verify that vault operators' governance arrangements for managing curator conflicts satisfy AIFMD II standards, not just that the operator holds a relevant license.</p><h3 id="what-is-iosco-recommendation-4-and-why-does-it-matter-for-defi-vault-design">What is IOSCO Recommendation 4, and why does it matter for DeFi vault design?</h3><p>IOSCO Recommendation 4 from its December 2023 DeFi Policy Recommendations requires regulators to mandate that DeFi Responsible Persons proactively identify and resolve conflicts of interest arising from various roles or affiliations. IOSCO applies its "same activity, same risk, same regulation" principle to DeFi: arrangements providing financial services equivalent to traditional intermediaries face the same conflict of interest requirements. IOSCO specifically identifies vertical integration of strategy design and execution as a category of conflict that may not be manageable through disclosure alone and may require structural remedies, including legal disaggregation of functions. With implementation progressing across jurisdictions covering 95% of global securities markets, this recommendation is creating compliance obligations in an expanding set of regulatory frameworks.</p><h3 id="what-does-the-esma-common-supervisory-action-on-mifid-ii-conflicts-of-interest-mean-in-practice">What does the ESMA Common Supervisory Action on MiFID II conflicts of interest mean in practice?</h3><p>ESMA launched a Common Supervisory Action on MiFID II conflict of interest compliance in 2026, running through the year across national competent authorities in EU member states. The action specifically examines remuneration structures and their impact on product recommendations, the role of digital platforms in directing investors toward certain products, and whether firms manage conflicts between their own profits and client needs. All three focus areas apply directly to curator incentive structures in DeFi vault products. Firms under supervisory scrutiny that cannot demonstrate governance controls for these conflicts face regulatory action ranging from supervisory guidance to enforcement.</p><hr><h2 id="about-p2porg"><em>About </em><a href="http://p2p.org/?ref=p2p.org"><em>P2P.org</em></a></h2><p><a href="http://p2p.org/?ref=p2p.org"><em>P2P.org</em></a><em> builds the protection layer that sits between regulated institutions and DeFi execution environments, independently of the curators who manage allocation strategies. If you are evaluating the infrastructure requirements for a DeFi allocation program, </em><a href="https://p2p.org/?ref=p2p.org#form"><em>talk to our team</em></a><em>.</em></p><hr><p><strong><em>Disclaimer</em></strong><br>This article is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, compliance, or investment advice. Regulatory obligations may vary depending on jurisdiction and specific business activities. Readers should consult their own legal and compliance advisors regarding applicable requirements.</p>